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Abstract
In this communication, a simple mechanism in the optional public goods
game is experimentally investigated using two experimental settings; and
first time, the cyclic strategy pattern in full state space is demonstrated
by means of velocity. It is, furthermore, elaborated that the strategies of
cooperation, defection and nonparticipant form a Rock-Paper-Scissors type
cycle, and the cycle of three strategies are persistent over 200 rounds. This
cycle is very similar to the cycle given by evolutionary dynamics e.g. replica-
tor dynamics. The mechanism that nonparticipant can sustain cooperation
is driven by the Rock-Paper-Scissors type of cyclic dominance in the three
strategies. That is, if the cycle is existent, the cooperation will always sus-
tain. Meanwhile, the distribution of social states changes in the state space
and from cooperation as the most frequent strategy to defection and, from
defection to nonparticipant, forms a clear rotation path in a long run. These
results seem to implicate that the evolutionary dynamics has ability to cap-
ture the real dynamics applying not only on biosphere, but also on human
society.
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1. Introduction
Dissolving the ”tragedy of the commons” [1] is a central concern of study-
ing cooperation in humans. Numerous studies have been conducted applying
the ”public goods” game to study the problem of maintaining cooperation
in a group of unrelated individuals. The society achieves its highest payoff if
every individual contributes; however, defector always gets more than coop-
erator. In typical examples, the individual contributions are multiplied by a
factor r and then divided equally among all players. Where r is smaller than
the group size, which is an example of a social dilemma [2, 3]. Although most
of the people do not contribute zero to a common pool in the one-shot public
goods game or in the initial stage of repeated public goods game, but the
contributions usually decline over a few rounds [4]. Vast experimental work
on public goods game has focused on two different conditions which would
lead to high contributions to the public pool, punishment [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] or/and reward [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26],
and reputation [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. However, Christoph
Hauert et al. [38, 39] pointed out, reciprocal altruism fails to provide a so-
lution if interactions are not repeated often enough or groups are too large.
Punishment and reward can be very effective but require that defectors must
be traced and identified.
In 1993, John M. Orbell and Robyn M. Dawes [40] outlined a model
of freedom to choose between playing and not playing particular Prisoner’s
Dilemma games and conducted experiments which showed that: (1) Social
welfare and the relative welfare of intending cooperators are higher when
subjects are free to choose between entering and not entering particular Pris-
oner’s Dilemma relationships; and this difference is a consequence of intend-
ing cooperator’s greater willingness to enter such relationship, not because of
any capacity to recognize and avoid intending defectors. In 1995, John Batali
and Philip Kitcher [41] also compared the evolution of altruism in optional
and compulsory games. In their theoretical analysis, populations playing the
compulsory game can become stuck in states of low cooperation that last
many generations, while the optional games provide routes out of such states
to states of high cooperation. And their computational simulations of the
evolution of populations playing these games support their analytic results.
Christoph Hauert et al. [38, 39] presented models introducing a third op-
tion named non-participation into public goods game. That means, people
can either join the public goods game and then choose cooperate (C), de-
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fect (D), or refuse to participate in the game (N). The game are denoted,
hereafter, as NCD games. Then a cycle of the three strategies, Rock-Paper-
Scissors type, is predicted. When cooperators are more frequent, defectors
can exploit a large group of cooperators, whereas loners have the highest
profit when defectors are frequent. When loners are most frequent, the pub-
lic group size is reduced inviting cooperation because the game is no longer
a dilemma in small groups [2, 3, 42, 43]. Hence, volunteering relaxes the
social dilemma: instead of defectors winning the world, coexistence among
cooperators, defectors and loners is expected[44]. Later, Tatsuya Sasaki et
al. [45] investigated punishment and reward effect in this public goods game.
Thus, nonparticipant as a natural mechanism is theoretically well studied,
and the cyclic pattern in the full state space is clearly exhibited.
Dirk Semmann et al. [46], following the above theoretical approach, con-
ducted an experiment in which a sample group of 6 players was randomly
chosen from a large population of 14. They manipulated initial conditions
and produced each predicted direction. By manipulating displayed decisions,
it is pretended that if the defectors have the highest frequency, the loners soon
become most frequent, as do the cooperators after the loners and defecators.
On average, cooperation is perpetuated at a substantial level. However, the
results, based on the initial conditions they manipulated, didn’t come out in
the subsequent real experiment over 50 rounds. It is not clear, whether the
Rock-Paper-Scissors type strategy cycle exists in the real experiment or not.
That means, in the perspective of evolution, the empirical cyclic dynamic
pattern in the full state space has not been proved experimentally.
In this article, the mechanism in the optional public goods game is in-
vestigated experimentally, and first time, the cyclic strategy pattern in full
state space is demonstrated by means of velocity. The remaining of this ar-
ticle is organized as follows: section two describes the experimental design
and procedure; section three demonstrates the results; and the last discusses
and concludes the results.
2. Experimental design and procedure
2.1. Game and payoffs
The public goods game, which is employed here, is actually known as
optional public goods game [38, 39]. Different with compulsory public goods
game, there are three options, viz. cooperate (C), defect (D) and refuse to
participate in the game (N), which are denoted, as NCD games. That means,
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the subject not willing to participate in the public goods game can choose
N, but if he participates, he has two options, C and D. If only one person
participates in the game, then, we think he will be equivalent to a loner.
The public goods game starts only when two or more persons are there to
participate in.
The parameters used in our experiments are similar to that Tatsuya
Sasaki et al. have used in their theoretical analysis [45], where nonpartici-
pation with intermittent cooperation bursts and form a Rock-Paper-Scissors
type cycle, N-C-D-N. From time to time, n = 5 players are faced with an
opportunity to participate in a public goods game. If the subject refuses to
participate, and chooses N, he gets 0, but if he decides to participate, he
pays at a cost g = 0.5 irrespective whether he chooses C or D. If the subject
chooses C, then he will contribute a fixed amount c = 1, which will be be
multiplied by r = 3 and will distributed equally among all other participators
of the group (except himself). If the subject chooses D, he will contribute 0
and share the cooperator’s contribution. The payoffs for cooperator, defector
and Nonparticipator are Pc, Pd, and Pn, respectively, and is given by:
Pc = −g − c + rc
nc − 1
nc + nd − 1
, (1)
Pd = −g + rc
nc
nc + nd − 1
, (2)
Pn = 0, (3)
where nc is the number of cooperators and nd is the number of defectors.
Therefore, if all subjects choose C, then each of them gets 1.5; if all subjects
choose D, then each of them gets -0.5; the defector will always get additional
(c + rc
nc+nd−1
) than the cooperator only if there is a cooperator. So, social
dilemma appears since the group will get the maximum payoff if all subjects
choose C, however defector always gets more than cooperator. The nonpar-
ticipator will get 0 at all conditions. Therefore, the option N provides an
opportunity to escape the deadlock of defection. When N is frequent, co-
operation is invited. Again, once cooperator emerges, the defector will take
advantage of cooperator. The Rock-Paper-Scissors type strategy cycles are
expected.
2.2. Population size
According to the evolutionary dynamics [38, 39, 45], from time to time,
sample group of N players are randomly chosen from a large population and
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asked to participate in a single public goods game. Following the theoret-
ical research [38, 39, 45] and the experimental investigation [46], we set a
treatment in which, from time to time, a sample group of 5 players is ran-
domly chosen from a large population of 13. Besides this, we add another
treatment of a population size of 5, that means the five players are fixed in a
group and interact with each other from time to time. This setting allows us
to investigate the population itself instead of sample group, and to trace the
individual’s behavior period by period. We call fixed group T1 and sample
group T2.
2.3. Information feedback
For treatment 1, where the group is fixed, the feedback includes every
player’s strategy used in the previous round and the corresponding score.
Particularly, every player has a unique and unaltered number in the group.
The feedback for treatment 2 includes the frequency of strategy C, D and
N, used in the sample group of 5 players and the corresponding payoff of
every strategy. And this information is provided not only to members of the
sample group but also to unchosen members remained in the population in
the previous round.
In summary, the two treatments are exhibited in Table 1.
Table 1: Treatment Summary
Treatment Population Size Feedback Groups
T1 5 every player’s strategy and score 12
T2 13 the number of strategy and relative score 6
2.4. Experimental procedure
The experiments were conducted in the Experimental Social Science Lab-
oratory of Zhejiang University from 27 May, 2012 to 26 April, 2013. Each
session lasted about 1 hour including the introduction and a quiz via com-
puter. Each subject was made to sit on an isolated seat with a computer,
no communication was allowed during the experiment. The software for the
experiments was developed as a web based system designed by the authors.
Every subject made decision by using ’C’, ’D’ or ’N’ button. After the last
one submitted the decision, every player received the feedback. Each session
consisted 200 rounds. At the conclusion of the experiments, every subject
obtained the cumulative score (CS). Each subject’s CS (CS × 13/5, in T2)
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including initial account (225) was converted into RMB currency according
to 0.1 × CS as payments. In addition, each participator was paid 5 Yuan
RMB as the showing up fee. The average payoff was 28 Yuan RMB. All 138
(5× 12+ 13× 6) students of Zhejiang Univerisity majoring in different areas
were recruited into these experiments and each subject participated only in
one session.
3. Results
3.1. The distribution of strategy use
The average cooperation rate of group are 0.224 and 0.096, in T1 and
T2, respectively, while the defection rate of group are 0.385 and 0.466, re-
spectively. We are also interested in the cooperation rate and defection rate
among the volunteers, i.e. given the condition of participation, what would
be the cooperation rate and defection rate? We call them the conditional
cooperation and defection rate. The conditional cooperation rates are 0.363
in T1 and 0.169 in T2, while the conditional defection rates are 0.637 in T1
and 0.831 in T2, see Table 2.
Table 2: Strategy Use of Group
Treatment Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
T1 cooperation rate 12 0.224 0.085 0.102 0.340
T1 defection rate 12 0.385 0.092 0.230 0.527
T1 nonparticipant rate 12 0.391 0.141 0.162 0.609
T1 conditional cooperation rate 12 0.363 0.092 0.225 0.493
T1 conditional defection rate 12 0.637 0.092 0.507 0.775
T2 cooperation rate 6 0.096 0.033 0.072 0.151
T2 defection rate 6 0.466 0.068 0.367 0.552
T2 nonparticipant rate 6 0.438 0.093 0.324 0.560
T2 conditional cooperation rate 6 0.169 0.036 0.124 0.229
T2 conditional defection rate 6 0.831 0.035 0.771 0.876
The cooperation rates in both treatments are larger than 0 (p=0.0000,
n1=12 in T1 and p=0.0004, n2=6 in T2, t-test). The cooperation rate of
T1 is larger than that of T2 (p=0.002, z=3.092, n1=12 and n2=6, Mann-
Whitney test), the conditional cooperation rate of T1 is also larger than that
of T2 (p=0.0015, z=3.184, n1=12 and n2=6, Mann-Whitney test), while the
defection rate of T1 is smaller than that of T2 (p=0.075, z=-1.780, n1=12
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and n2=6, Mann-Whitney test), again, the conditional defection rate of T1
is smaller than that of T2 (p=0.0015, z=-3.184, n1=12 and n2=6, Mann-
Whitney test). Interestingly, there is no significant difference between two
treatments on nonparticipant rate (p=0.5741, z=-0.562, n1=12 and n2=6,
Mann-Whitney test).
3.2. The overall trend of strategy use over time
The strategy use keeps changing over 200 rounds. At the beginning of the
game, the strategy C is used frequently, and the strategy N is used rarely.
The cooperation rate of first round is 0.52 ± 0.20 (mean ±s.d.) in T1 and
0.43±0.23 (mean ±s.d.) in T2, respectively. The nonparticipant rate of first
round is 0.07 ± 0.13 (mean ±s.d.) in T1 and 0.27 ± 0.21 (mean ±s.d.) in
T2. The defection rate of first round is 0.41± 0.20 (mean ±s.d.) in T1 and
0.30±0.11 (mean ±s.d.) in T2. However, the cooperation rate declines quite
quickly while the strategies D and strategy N increase. Later, the strategy
D is used over strategy C, and it becomes the most frequent strategy, and
the defection rate comes to it’s pick value, 0.63 ± 0.24 (mean ±s.d.) at
round 29 in T1 and 0.83 ± 0.23 (mean ±s.d.) at round 12, in T2. After
that, the defection rate keeps dropping with fluctuations, but remains over
the cooperation rate. After half of the experimental process, the strategy N
become the most frequently used strategy, and this result is maintained till
end. At the last round, the cooperation rate is 0.13 ± 0.16 (mean ±s.d.) in
T1 and 0.07±0.10 (mean ±s.d) in T2; the defection rate is 0.28±0.26 (mean
±s.d.) in T1 and 0.37 ± 0.29 (mean ±s.d) in T2; the nonparticipant rate is
0.58 ± 0.35 (mean ±s.d.) in T1 and 0.57 ± 0.32 (mean ±s.d) in T2. The
change of strategy use over time is illustrated in Figure 1.
It seems that there is a sequence in strategy use, i.e. C–D–N in above
analysis. However, after N, the strategy C does not remain the most fre-
quent strategy, thus makes the Rock-Paper-Scissors type cycle of strategy
imperfect.
However, we should notice that the above graph is the synthetic (aver-
age) trend of strategy use over the time, which implies that the curve may
cover the details of the strategy change of each group, only if the different
groups have same frequency of oscillation and happen to move synchronously.
We, while analysing the dynamic pattern, we must use the group level data
independently. Every group’s strategies use over the time is illustrated in
Figure 2.
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Figure 1: The strategy use over time. The left panel is T1 and the right one is T2.
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Figure 2: Each group’s strategy use over time. The graphs in the first and second rows
are of T1 and the graphs in the third row are of T2.
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The trend of strategy use of group is roughly similar to that of the overall
trend, but the fluctuation of each strategy use is more obvious. Especially,
the cooperation strategy (red line) emerges occasionally after a long declining
period and all strategies fluctuate abruptly till end. This inspires us to detect
the regular pattern (the law) round by round.
3.3. The mean velocity of state change
Evolutionary game theory assumes that payoff of a strategy determines
the growth rate of its frequency within the population [47]. The populations
can evolve, in the sense that the frequencies xi change with time; and let the
state x(t) depend on time, and denote by x˙i(t) the velocity with which xi
changes, i.e. x˙i = dxi/dt ( [48] p31). Specifically, for example, the replicator
dynamics [49] gives the velocity of the frequencies xi of the strategies i by
x˙i =
∑
j
xixj(Pi − Pj) = xi(Pi − P¯ ) (4)
where P¯ =
∑
xjPj is the average payoff in the population.
In every period, the population must be in a certain state which is de-
scribed by a combination of strategies’ frequencies [50]. Here, in CDN game,
the social state is denoted by xncd or (xC , xD, xN), where, xC , xD, and xN
represent the proportion of players choosing strategy C, D and N, respec-
tively. For example, in a society of five, the social state is (1
5
, 2
5
, 2
5
), if one
person chooses C, two persons choose D and the remaining two choose N.
Fig. 3 (left) represents the social states in the state space of the CDN game.
In physics, velocity is the measurement of the rate and direction of change
in position of an object. And the instantaneous velocity is always tangential
to trajectory. The velocity of a society evolution is a vector of all strategies’
change. Theoretically, an evolutionary dynamics equation has provided the
velocity in the full state space. Following the velocity notion above, Xu and
Wang [51, 52, 53] introduced an empirical method to measure the velocity
of strategy density change in the state space. Given a certain state xo =
(xc, xd, xn) in the state space as an object of observation, suppose that the
group is just right at the state xo at time t. For this observation xo, there
is a state x+ in the next round t + 1 and a state x− in the previous round
t− 1. The empirical velocity at a state xo is given by:
vo = [(x+ − xo) + (xo − x−)]/(2△ t) = (x+ − x−)/(2△ t), (5)
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Figure 3: State space and velocity schematic diagram. The left panel is state space for
the public goods game in which each point presents a social state. The three numerals
under every state represent the frequencies of strategy C, D and N, respectively. The
middle panel is a schematic diagram about velocity. At time t, the group is at state A, i.e.
xo = (2
5
, 1
5
, 2
5
), at time t− 1, the group is at state B, i.e., x− = (1
5
, 0, 4
5
), and at time t+1,
the group is at state C, i.e. x+ = (2
5
, 2
5
, 1
5
). The right panel is an example of evolutionary
velocity of strategies given by replicator dynamics.
where △t = 1 indicates the time duration between two rounds in experiment,
i.e. the time of one round. The key point of the measurement here is that
during the calculation of the velocity, the backward change connot be ignored.
The velocity is the composition of forward velocity v+ = (x+ − xo)/△ t and
backward velocity v− = (xo − x−)/△ t, vo = (v+ + v−)/2.
From time to time, the given state xo may be passed many times. The
average velocity v¯o at this state xo is given by:
v¯o =
∑
o
vo/Ω, (6)
where Ω is the frequency of observed vo.
Now it is easy to get the velocity for every state, because all the conditions
are getting the state data. According to the individual’s choice, we calculate
the state vector for every group of every round, then according the Eq. 6, we
get the velocity at every state (Figure. 4).
Obviously, the cyclic dynamic patterns are clear in both treatments, es-
pecially in treatment 1. The directions are consistent with the evolutionary
dynamics, for example the replicator dynamics (shown in Figure 3). Mag-
nitude and direction of velocity to compare empirical velocity with the the-
oretical velocity at every state are used. Each velocity has its component
vx and component vy. The magnitude ‖v¯
o‖ of velocity as well as direction,
which can be described by the intersection angle α from vx to v¯
o are given
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red star is the mean observed state of all groups of all rounds.
by equation:
‖v¯o‖ =
√
v¯2x + v¯
2
y (7)
α = arctan
v¯y
v¯x
(8)
The replicator dynamics equation is used as an example to get the theo-
retical velocity and its corresponding magnitude ‖v‖ and angle α. For each
state, we get the empirical velocity, that means, total 21 outcomes. However,
the replicator dynamics only provides 16 outcomes, we get no information on
the state (1, 0, 0), (1
5
, 0, 4
5
), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1
5
, 4
5
), and (0, 1, 0). So, liner regression
is adopted for these 16 observations. The coefficients of magnitude ‖v¯o‖ are
0.135 (p=0.000, Adj-R2=0.821) in T1 and 0.130 (p=0.001, Adj-R2=0.554)
in T2, respectively, while the coefficients of angle α are 0.497 (p=0.037, Adj-
R2=0.224) in T1 and 0.290 (p=0.080, Adj-R2=0.145) in T2, respectively.
Obviously, the results of magnitude are better than those of angle, as well
the results of T1 are better than those of T2.
As explicated in the Figure 4, the distribution of state is quite unequal
in the space. The distribution of strategies are spread near the DN edge,
especially in T2. Hence, the scatter with weights of frequencies at each state
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Figure 5: Scatter graph. The first two graphs are the results of magnitude and the last two
graphs are the results of direction, respectively. The cycle size is related to the frequency
of vo at that state.
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Figure 6: The distribution and velocity over time.
is plotted in Figure 5.
These results seem to implicate that the evolutionary dynamics has ability
to capture the real dynamics not only on biosphere, but also on human
society.
3.4. The distribution and velocity over time
The velocity patterns discussed above are the overall results about all 200
rounds, related to the trend of strategies which has been shown in Figure 1,
where the spiral pattern itself may change over time. To find out whether
the cyclic pattern will disappear, when N strategy is used frequently, the 200
rounds are divided successively into four segments, each of them including
50 rounds (Figure 6).
Interestingly, the cyclic pattern exists in all four stages. It is noteworthy
that after 100 rounds, the N strategy is almost the most frequent strategy
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and the C strategy is always the most rare strategy, the cyclic pattern still
exists. And in the third stage of T1, the pattern is so clear and similar to
the pattern given by replicator dynamics (α: Coef.=0.607, p=0.007; ‖v¯o‖:
Coef.=0.109, p=0.000).
The state change is like the whirlwind. The frequencies of strategies
change quickly while the distribution of states in the state space moves spi-
rally and slowly. From the first 50 rounds to the last 50 rounds, the overall
distribution of social states changes in the state space and, from cooperation
as the frequent strategy to defection and from defection to nonparticipation,
forms a clear rotation path in a long run. The rotation path of state distri-
bution seems to be ending at the N strategy, fewer remaining in the cycles.
So, as time goes on, the distribution rotate from C to D, and from D to N
slowly, meanwhile, the cycles become clearer from the second 50 rounds and
persist over 200 rounds though there are more noise in the last 50 rounds.
3.5. The individual’s strategy cycles
The results of cyclic pattern of social state change are shown above. How-
ever, it is still not clear that does the individual use the strategies cyclicly as
well? Supposedly, the individual’s choice to select one strategy will increase
the frequency of that strategy in the population, and therefore will push the
individual himself to turn to the more profitable strategy at that state. The
individual will find the defection is more profitable when he chooses C, then
he might turn to choose D, and he might turn to choose N when he chooses
D after finding other people choose D as well. We use the time series data
of individual decision to detect the order of strategies. The full set loop is
(C-C, D-D, N-N, C-D-C, C-N-C, D-C-D, D-N-D, N-C-N, N-D-N, C-D-N-C,
C-N-D-C, D-N-C-D, D-C-N-D, N-C-D-N, and N-D-C-N). Among them, C-D-
N-C, C-N-D-C, D-N-C-D, D-C-N-D, N-C-D-N, and N-D-C-N form the real
strategy cycle, in which, C-D-N-C, D-N-C-D, and N-C-D-N are anticlockwise
and C-N-D-C, D-C-N-D and N-D-C-N are clockwise.
We can trace the individual’s behaviors round by round in T1. The num-
ber of Rock-Paper-Scissors type loops (anticlockwise) is 180, while the num-
ber of anti-Rock-Paper-Scissors type loops (clockwise) is 72, the net number
of Rock-Paper-Scissors type loops of individual’s strategy is 108. Table 3
exhibits the number of these cycles and the ratio of each type of the cycle.
These results implicate that the individual’s strategies present the character-
istic of the cycle, and the direction is consistent with the cycle of social state
change.
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Table 3: The Individual’s Strategy Cycles
Cycle Type Frequency Ratio
Anticlockwise 180 0.714
C-D-N-C 95 0.377
D-N-C-D 77 0.306
N-C-D-N 8 0.032
Clockwise 72 0.286
C-N-D-C 34 0.135
D-C-N-C 31 0.123
N-D-C-N 7 0.028
Total 252 1
Net Anticlockwise 108 0.429
C-N-D-C 61 0.242
D-C-N-C 46 0.183
N-D-C-N 1 0.004
So, the Rock-Paper-Scissors type of cycle exists not only at the aggregate
social level but also at the individual level.
4. Discussion and conclusion
4.1. Cyclic dominance and cooperation sustaining
The mechanism by which nonparticipant can sustain cooperation is the
Rock-Paper-Scissors type of cyclic dominance of the three strategies. That
is, if the cycle is existent, the cooperation will always sustain. Otherwise,
the cooperation cannot sustain stably in a long run even it may emerge
occasionally. From the results above, it seems that, if the cycle is perfect,
the cooperation is stable. For example, the cyclic pattern in the state space in
the third stage in T1 is more perfect than other stages, while the cooperation
in this stage is more stable. And the cyclic pattern of T1 is more perfect
than that of T2, while the cooperation in T1 sustains better than T2.
The parameter used here is not the best for forming cyclic strategy evo-
lution and therefore maintaining cooperation. The parameter used here, as
mentioned in experimental design, is just the parameter that Sasaki et al. [45]
used in their theoretical model which forecasts the existence of cycle as well
as the outcome of strategy N. This parameter gives us more opportunities
to further investigate the cooperation condition based on the Rock-Paper-
Scissors type of cyclic dominance of the three strategies. For example, if we
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raise r, the cooperation might be more invited after N as Christoph Hauert
et al [38] has pointed out. Furthermore, to introduce institutional incentive,
i.e. reward or punishment as Sasaki et al. [45] has studied, or the underly-
ing population structure as Szabo´ and Hauert [54] studied, this parameter
presents the marginal condition for forming strategy cycle. If the empirical
cycle can be detected in this condition, then the existence of strategy cycle
in the better condition is in prospect, and the diverse model based on these
dynamics equations can be studied experimentally.
4.2. Group size, population size and cooperation
From the perspective of the individual, it is easy to understand why state
change from C to D, and from D to N. However, it is difficult to understand
why state will change from N to C. Indeed, it is really happened, but what
is the real reason?
One possible explanation for the change from N to C is that when N strat-
egy is more frequently used, the group size becomes small. The smaller the
group is, the easier the reputation establishes. Is cooperation more favorable
in smaller group? Table 4 exhibits the different cooperation frequencies and
ratios under five groups sizes.
Table 4: The cooperation under five conditions
T1 T2
Given N nc nd nc/nc+d nc nd nc/nc+d
0 1439 1546 0.482 150 600 0.200
1 692 1336 0.341 190 834 0.186
2 341 901 0.275 137 772 0.151
3 150 498 0.231 75 433 0.148
4 62 344 0.153 25 156 0.138
In Table 4, the first column is the condition given by the number of
nonparticipators. If the number equals to 5, that means no one can choose
C or D, so the range is from 0 to 4. The second column is the total number
of people choosing C and the third column is the total number of people
choosing D, and the fourth column is the ratio of the number of of people
choosing C over all participators in T1. For example, given the condition that
the number of nonparticipator is 0 for T1, the number of people choosing C
is 1439, and the number of people choosing D is 1546, the ratio C/(C +D)
is 0.482. And the T2 is organized in the same way. We find no evidence to
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support the point of view that the cooperation is more easy to establish in
smaller group. On contrary, it seems that the cooperation is more frequent
in large group.
Actually, the group size here is changing all over the time, whereas the
population size is fixed. The population size of T1 is 5 and of T2 is 13. As
mentioned above (see Table 2, the cooperation rate and conditional cooper-
ation rate of T1 are higher than those of T2. It indicatess if the population
is large, the cooperation is low. This results are similar to John Duffy’s
work [55]. The cooperation established in a small group depends on the di-
rect or indirect reciprocation. And this needs the glutinousness condition
that the probability of another round is sufficiently high [56, 28]. Small is
the necessary condition, but not the sufficient condition. If people cannot
believe the person in the group, the round will still stay in the group in next
round, the reputation can hardly be established. So, the question why state
changes from N to C remains for further investigate.
4.3. The bridge between evolutionary theory and experimental research
Theoretically, the cyclic dominance of the three strategies is provided by
evolutionary dynamics such as replicator dynamics. Although, mathematical
exploration of evolutionary models has been a hot topic of research recently
(see, e.g., Weibull, 1995), but it could not catch held of the experimenters.
Camerer has pointed out that evolutionary models apply best to animals with
genetically heritable strategies, or to human cultural evolution (Boyd and
Richerson, 1985), neither of which explains rapid individual learning in the
lab (see Camerer [57] p268). Huyck also emphasized: A lesson from the ex-
periment is that one should discount models that predict deterministic cycles
(p148 in [58]). Since the subjects don’t exhibit the kind of correlated behavior
predicted by the dynamic (p139 in [58]). On the other hand, Borgers argued
that, in an appropriately constructed continuous time limit, the learning
process’ actual movement will not differ from its expected movement [59].
In this article, we provided the empirical cyclic dynamic pattern in full
state space experimentally. And the result is very similar to the result given
by replicator dynamics. It seems possible to establish the bridge between
evolutionary theory and experimental research. If we use the new statistic
measurement, for example the velocity, and get sufficient data, we can find
the way to investigate the empirical dynamic pattern and can compare it
with the evolutionary dynamics.
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4.4. Conclusion
In this article, we have investigated the mechanism experimentally in the
optional public goods game, and have shown, first time, the cyclic strategy
pattern in full state space. It is also demonstrated that the strategies of
cooperation, defection and nonparticipant form a Rock-Paper-Scissors type
cycle, and the cycle of three strategies are persistent over 200 rounds. This
cycle is very similar to the cycle given by evolutionary dynamics, for ex-
ample, replicator dynamics. And the Rock-Paper-Scissors type cycle is not
only existent at social level, but also at the individual level, that means the
individual’s strategies sequence of anticlockwise cycle of N-C-D-N exceeds
it’s adverse cycle. Meanwhile, the distribution of social states changes in
the state space and, from cooperation as the most frequent strategy to de-
fection and from defection to nonparticipant, forms a clear rotation path in
a long run. Our results seem to implicate that the evolutionary dynamics
has ability to capture the real dynamics not only on biosphere, but also on
human society. This investigation provides the base structure to study the
mechanism to sustain cooperation by evolutionary dynamics.
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